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Abstract  
 
This paper explores the philosophical assumptions of the FairShares Model - a set of social 
enterprise development guidelines published by the FairShares Association. In post-crisis economies 
with deregulated public services, the principles of the free-market set forth a challenge to many 
organisations within the social economy.  Previous contributions to the literature on social economy 
have drawn on communitarian philosophy to develop insights into mutual principles.  This paper sets 
out a theoretical framework to evaluate whether the FairShares Model represents a communitarian 
pluralist discourse on the constitution of social enterprises.   
After close analysis of antecedent model rules and their influence, the FairShares Model is theorised 
as a predominantly communitarian pluralist discourse with some ‘corporatist’ commitments.  It 
represents an evolving set of guidelines for the ‘socialisation’ of enterprise by devising membership 
rights for two primary stakeholders (labour, users), and two secondary stakeholders (founders, 
investors).  Exploring intellectual antecedents clarifies the social entrepreneurial and cooperative 
traditions that have influenced its development.  The FairShares Model offers an alternative to 
private sector models based on the subordination of labour and mutual models based on the primacy 
of a single stakeholder group.   It is designed to reverse the centralising and accumulating tendencies 
of the private sector without returning assets to state control.  It differs from philanthropic models by 
offering co-operative (par value) shares to three member classes: founders, labour and users, and 
(ordinary) ‘investor’ shares to all classes of member. 
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Introduction 
This paper examines the emergence of the FairShares Model – a set of principles for the constitution 
of social enterprises based on the integration of ‘founders’, ‘users’, ‘labour’ and ‘investors’.  It has 
emerged from the works of practitioners, academics and consultants who have a specialist interest in 
constituting (and studying the constitution of) co-operative and social enterprises.  The paper reflects 
on the founding research to answer the question ‘To what extent is the FairShares Model a 
communitarian pluralist approach to constituting social enterprises?’  By grounding a discussion in 
the systematic study of antecedent model Articles of Association, the paper contributes a new history 
to the development of social enterprise that is grounded in the praxis of communitarian pluralism.  
The FairShares Model is presented by founders of the FairShares Association as a set of brand 
principles and collection of model rules for ‘self-governing co-operatives, mutuals and social 
enterprises’ ([Author 1] et al., yyy3, p. 4).  Paradoxically, it is both an end point and start point for 
practitioner debates about constitutional issues: it represents an end-point for proprietary model rules 
abandoned in favour of the FairShares Model.  Concurrently, it represents a new starting point for a 
broad community of social enterprise practitioners to debate multi-stakeholder principles. 
The paper is divided into five parts.  In the first part, we set out the assumptions of communitarian 
philosophy and distinguish unitary and pluralist applications.  In doing so, the concept of 
communitarian pluralism is defined with sufficient precision to act as a theoretical lens through 
which to assess the FairShares Model.  In the second section, we outline the methodology for the 
study, and how information was collected about the intellectual antecedents of the FairShares Model.  
In the third section, we report our findings on the historical influences and model rules from which 
the FairShares Model takes its heritage.  This historical perspective enables links between concepts 
in the antecedents to be mapped against the concepts as they are applied in the new model.  Having 
done so, we identify core propositions in the FairShares Model and argue that they represent a 
communitarian pluralist discourse on the ‘socialisation’ of enterprise ownership, governance and 
management.  To conclude the paper, we briefly compare this to the discourses of ‘privatisation’ and 
‘nationalisation’. 
Communitarian Pluralism 
Communitarian pluralism is a distinct strand of thought within the broader field of communitarian 
philosophy (Driver and Martell, 1997; Crowder, 2006).  In the context of business, communitarian 
philosophy has been linked to both collectivist forms of ownership, and stakeholder (rather than 
shareholder) governance (Vinten, 2001; [Author 1], yyy7, yyy0). 
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Communitarian philosophy positions itself in opposition to liberal writings on individualism. 
Influenced by theorists such as Avineri and de-Shalit (1992), communitarians critique individualist 
philosophy on the basis that it misrepresents the individual in society.  They believe that people are 
profoundly influenced by social, cultural and historical contexts to the extent that their thoughts, 
desires, narratives of action and personal agency are all contingent on community relationships 
(Lukes, 1974, Habermas, 1987).   
Driver and Martin (1997) helpfully review the dimensions of, and arguments for, variants of 
communitarian philosophy.  They identity three arguments: a) a sociological argument that people 
are primarily social beings rather than isolated individuals; b) an ethical argument that ‘community’ 
is ‘good’ because systems of collective provision secure individual well-being, and c) a meta-ethical 
argument that goodness and virtue are themselves products of discourse in the community, and 
cannot be standardised. While the above represent philosophical arguments for communitarianism, 
they leave open questions about the policies and practices that create a communitarian culture.  In an 
attempt to answer this, Driver and Martin (1997) created a theoretical framework for comparing 
‘unitarist’ (conformist) and ‘pluralist’ (liberal) communitarianism (see Figure 3). 
Figure 1 – Dimensions of Communitarian Philosophy 
Conformist (Unitarist) Pluralist 
More Conditional  
(rights in return for responsibilities) 
Less Conditional  
(rights not conditional on responsibilities)  
Conservative  
(socially conservative) 
Progressive  
(socially liberal)  
Prescriptive  
(systems for the enforcement of social norms) 
Voluntary  
(loose networks with varying social norms)  
Moral  
(driven by religion and/or ideology) 
Socio-Economic  
(driven by self-regulating ‘relations of production’)  
Corporatist  
(rights / responsibilities apply to organisations) 
Individualist 
(rights / responsibilities apply to individuals)  
A unitary form of communitarianism is socially conservative, expecting discipline from 
community members in observance of moral norms that represent the ‘conditions’ of community 
membership.  Moreover, unitary communitarians argue for the extension of these values to both 
‘legal persons’ (i.e. incorporated organisations) and ‘natural persons’.  They set out expectations that 
corporations will accept their ‘responsibility’ to contribute to community well-being.  A pluralist 
form of communitarianism does not make community membership conditional on obedience to fixed 
social norms.  As such it is more socially liberal, less normative, and adopts a socio-economic 
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perspective that it is preferable for human values to be regulated by democratic institutions than by 
central religious or political ‘authorities’. 
Whereas Coase (1937) assumed that enterprise cultures are unitary because decisions are under 
the control of an entrepreneur, Tam argues that ‘alternative’ enterprises:  
…treat [enterprise] workers, suppliers and customers, as well as their senior 
management and shareholders, as members of a shared community…Cooperation in this 
context does not mean bargaining to secure the best advantage for one's own group with 
minimal concession to others, but to developing shared values and long-term goals. 
Tam (1999:10) 
In evaluating the FairShares Model, it is worth noting Tam’s starting point: a multi-stakeholder 
orientation that includes “workers, suppliers and customers…senior managers and shareholders”.  He 
argues for co-operative inquiry to reconcile tensions in personal and group agendas.  Echoes of these 
sentiments emerged in an empirical study of the Community Company Model (Coad and Cullen, 
2001; [Author 1] et al., yyy3; [Author 1], yyy0).  In a submission to a UK government consultation, 
the social systems in the Community Company Model for enterprise ‘ownership’, ‘governance’ and 
‘management’ are modified to allow groups with divergent interests to co-exist.   
Prior work by [Author 1] between 2003 – 2012 identifies differences in unitary and pluralist 
approaches to enterprise development.  As a result, it is possible to summarise choices at 
incorporation (or conversion) linked to unitarist and pluralist systems of ownership, governance and 
management.  By using these choices as proxies, a framework for assessing the application of 
communitarian philosophy in the FairShares Model can be outlined (see Figure 2).   
Figure 2 – Communitarian Philosophy in Enterprise Design 
Proxies for a Unitarist Culture  Proxies for a Pluralist Culture Academic Sources 
Ownership 
Single class of shareholders / members Multiple classes of shareholders / members Atherton et al., 2012;  
Birchall, 2011, 2012; [Author 1] and 
[Author 2], 2011. 
Common ownership Joint ownership / co-ownership Gates, 1998; Brown, 2004; Reeves, 
2007; [Author 1], 2007, 2012 
Owners / trustees from a single 
stakeholder 
Owners / trustees from two or more 
stakeholders, particularly employees and 
beneficiaries.  
Brown, 2006; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; 
[Author 1] and [Author 2], 2013. 
Governance 
Centrally controlled (hierarchy of) 
governing bodies 
Loose network of governing bodies Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Turnbull, 
1994, 1995, 2002. 
Representative democracy and/or 
autocracy 
Associative democracy and/or sociocracy Hirst, 1994; Romme, 1999; Romme, 
and Endenburg (2006); Smith and 
Teasdale, 2012. 
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Proxies for a Unitarist Culture  Proxies for a Pluralist Culture Academic Sources 
Single beneficiary group Multiple beneficiary groups Vinten, 2002; [Author 1] et al., 2003; 
[Author 1], 2007; Chadwick-Coule, 
2011. 
Management 
One stakeholder’s political interests 
dominate 
Reconciliation / negotiation of stakeholder 
interests 
Amin, 2009; [Author 1] and Bennett, 
2011; Smith and Teasdale, 2012. 
Line management / single reporting 
systems 
Matrix management / flexible reporting 
systems 
Turnbull, 2002; [Author 2] and 
Compton, 2006; [Author 2], 2007; 
Cathcart, 2009, 2013. 
Employment relations / economic 
entrepreneurship  
Member relations / associative 
entrepreneurship 
Chell, 2007; Scott-Cato et al., 2008; 
Erdal, 2011; Birchall, 2011. 
Recognising that there are different social systems for ownership, governance and management 
helps with interpreting paradoxes in studies of ‘alternative’ organisations.  For example Melman 
(2001) highlights how employee-ownership may not be accompanied by employee-participation in 
governance or management.  Similarly, texts on employee engagement rarely move beyond detailed 
discussions of participatory management to consider the role of ownership and governance on 
engagement (compare Macey and Schneider, 2008 with Matrix Evidence, 2010). 
Methodology 
This research treats the FairShares Model as a case study in social enterprise development (Rule and 
John, 2011).  At this stage, the generalisability of the findings is less important than understanding 
them.  A rich case study interpreted through the lens of communitarian pluralism (Figures 1 and 2) 
provides a methodology for comparing different approaches to social enterprise.  This in itself 
represents a valuable contribution to knowledge. 
In this study, the closeness of one author to the development of the FairShares Model creates a 
methodological challenge.  [Author 1]’s position as a co-author (and co-founder of the FairShares 
Association) increases the need for epistemic reflexivity (Johnson and Duberley, 2003).  For this 
reason, [Author 2] – who has had no formal involvement in either the design of the FairShares 
Model or the founding of the association - provides critical oversight of the interpretation of the 
material and a third party perspective on its relevance and positioning within the social economy.  To 
improve robustness, documentation provided by the FairShares Association was imported into 
NVivo for thematic analysis.  No restrictions were placed on access. 
For [Author 1], the study is an auto-ethnographic exploration of previous research (McIlveen, 
2008; Chang, 2008), and the way this has contributed to the formulation of a set of principles.  
A further motivation comes from founders and supporters of the FairShares Model who have 
requested clearer information on its core characteristics.  For [Author 2], the study represents an 
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initial engagement with the FairShares Model to add to a programme of research on organisational 
identity in the social economy (see Seanor et al 2013) and strategic management in social enterprise 
([Author 2], yyy7) and conceptualisations of ethical capital ([Author 2] et al., yyy1).  
Three data collection strategies have been adopted: 1) document analysis; 2) a survey of 
supporters; 3) interviews with founders and supporters.  This paper reports findings from 1) - 
document analysis.  It uses theory to provide insights into context and history, based on a close 
reading of documentation collected between February and June 2013 from: 
 FairShares Model Dropbox (a collection of 154 documents shared by developers of the model).   
 FairShares Wiki (a collection of 178 web pages created for its registered supporters). 
Four documents were found to contain specific information about intellectual antecedents: 
 FairShares Basics.pss (showing links between social entrepreneurship and co-operative development) 
 Antecedents of the FairShares Model (Case Studies).doc (four critiques of antecedent model rules) 
 FairShares Model – Introduction (see the section ‘Where do these ideas come from’?) 
 New Frontiers in Democratic Self-Management (a fresh comparison of three antecedent model rules)  
 A separate paper in 2014 will report findings from a survey and interviews with FairShares 
Association founders and supporters. 
The Origins of the FairShares Model  
The FairShares Wiki provides a section on 'background' (www.fairshares.wikispot.org/background) 
which contains a short presentation on the roots of multi-stakeholder social enterprises.  This 
provides a historical context for debates about the development of FairShares.  Within this 
presentation is Figure 3 which not only identifies traditions of consumer co-operation, social 
entrepreneurship and worker co-operation as key concepts, but also individuals and enterprises that 
have had a strong influence on their development.  
 Robert Owen lived from 1771 - 1858 and rose to prominence through New Lanark (a co-operative 
community).  He wrote extensively about the way 'character' is formed through educational processes 
and working conditions, and how investments in human capital benefitted both workers themselves 
and the financial well-being of factory owners (Owen, 1816).  The Rochdale Pioneers (to whom the 
Co-operative Group and the International Co-operative Alliance trace their history) included 
self-avowed 'Owenites'.  Charles Howarth, the author the first Laws and Objects of the Rochdale 
Society of Equitable Pioneers, and James Daly - the society's first secretary - were also former 
leaders of the Owenite movement in Rochdale (Wilson, Shaw and Lonergan, 2012; Ratner, 2013). 
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Figure 3 – The historical foundations of multi-stakeholder social enterprise 
 
Birchall (2012) describes nine Rochdale Principles documented by George Holyoake over two 
decades (Holyoake, 1922 [1858], 2013 [1877]).  In the 1944 film The Rochdale Pioneers based on 
Holyake’s histories, Charles Howarth is credited with devising a key innovation of the consumer 
co-operative model: paying dividends in proportion to trading activity rather than capital 
contributions.  Birchall (2012) noted that this social norm was so deeply internalised that it was an 
unwritten assumption until Holyoake’s work communicated it to the wider co-operative movement.  
After the codification of values and principles in 1937, an international movement developed that 
today turns over more than $1.6 trillion each year (Euricse, 2012; Ratner, 2013).   
Owen favoured co-operation at the level of the community, with industrial enterprises organised 
as producer co-operatives, and mutual societies providing education and welfare.  This influenced 
subsequent thinkers including John Spedan Lewis (JSL) (1948, 1954) who regarded the John Lewis 
Partnership (JLP) as an experiment in industrial democracy based on a 'co-operative society of 
producers'.  JSL was also influenced by the Soviet Incops model for worker education studied by 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Lewis, 1948; cited in Cathcart, 2009).  JSL spoke out vehemently against 
both nationalisation (which he regarded as a pathway to soviet-style communism) and a private 
economy of "absentee-capitalists who [get] excessive reward for their function of saving and lending” 
(Lewis, 1948: 173).  He argued that owners should individually receive no greater compensation than 
professionals hired to run their organisations (Paranque and Willmott, 2013), a view rooted in bitter 
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family arguments after JSL discovered that one year his father took more money from John Lewis 
and Sons Ltd than the entire wage bill for workers (Cathcart, 2009).  
Owen was also an important influence on Fr. Arizmendi who drew on his work to formulate 
co-operative principles at Mondragon (BBC, 1980).  Arizmendi was influenced by Owen's writings 
on education and the formation of character as well as Rochdale Principles regarding democracy 
(one-person, one-vote) and open membership (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Birchall, 2012).  In adapting 
the principles, Arizmendi organised producer co-operatives for industry and hybrid co-operatives 
(with both worker and consumer members) in banking, education and retailing ([Author 1], yyy0). 
Worker and Consumer Co-operation in Practice 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is now frequently cited in the press as a model for both private and 
public sector reform
1.  As staff join, they become ‘partners’ of the JLP and beneficiaries of an 
Employee Trust that owns John Lewis Department Stores and Waitrose (a food retailer).  Partners do 
not buy shares, nor do they receive dividends.  Instead, they become beneficiaries of a trust that 
exists for their benefit.  In the last decade the trust has paid bonuses averaging 15% of salary 
(Cathcart, 2013).  Partners elect 80% of 82 members of a partnership council that handles social 
development, and 5 of the 12 directors that control commercial decisions.  The partnership council 
has the power to remove the Chair of JLP if he or she acts unconstitutionally.  In addition to store 
councils and management committees there is a company-wide magazine called The Gazette and a 
local magazine called The Chronicle for partners to engage in a constant dialogue with managers 
(Erdal, 2011).  Finally, the company operates a system called ‘The Registry’ through which partners 
employ staff to monitor executive performance outside of management control (Cathcart, 2013).  As 
JLP is owned by shares held in trust, it is an example of common ownership, rather than joint 
ownership or co-ownership ([Author 1], yyy2). 
The Co-operative Group, in contrast, operates a system of individual membership based on 
Rochdale Principles that have been reinterpreted in 1937, 1966 and 1995 by the International Co-
operative Alliance.  Customers, upon becoming members, have an account to hold their capital 
contributions and dividends.  Each member’s share of profits is dependent on levels of trading (in 
food retail outlets, pharmacies, a travel company, banking and financial service institutions, funeral 
directors, legal services and a motoring company).  Rather than store councils (as happens at JLP), 
the Co-operative Group operate elected area committees.  Regional committees uphold co-operative 
values and principles.
2
   
Unlike John Lewis, Co-operative Group members contribute share capital to the organisation 
(albeit a nominal £1 deduction from a member’s first dividend).  The constitution of the Co-operative 
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Group follows ICA guidelines (Cathcart, 2013) and is more readily understood as a jointly owned 
enterprise in which members control ‘co-operative capital’ (Brown, 2004).  In a jointly owned 
enterprise, members of a primary stakeholder group have personal accounts that show their capital 
contributions and entitlements to a share of surpluses. 
A variation on this model is practised in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Whyte and 
Whyte, 1991).  Fr. Arizmendi helped to establish industrial cooperatives to which members 
contribute capital (typically about two months pay at local rates).  About 20% is converted to 
co-operative capital (Democracy at Work, 2013) while the balance become personal capital that 
attracts interest and an entitlement to a share of surpluses (typically 40-50% of the total).  While the 
amounts invested and distributed to individual members are higher than the Co-operative Group, the 
system is still based on members’ capital contributions, interest payments and dividend entitlements.  
It is a system of joint ownership with commonly owned co-operative capital in reserves and 
investment funds. 
An interesting evolution of this, and an example of co-ownership, is the Caja Laboral.  This is the 
banking institution created to support the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and its individual 
member-owners.  While John Lewis is wholly employee-owned, and the Cooperative Group wholly 
consumer-owned, the Caja has features of both.  Bird (2009) reports that the bank is 43% owned by 
workers and 57% owned by co-operatives.  The governing council is formed by electing four worker 
representatives and eight consumer representatives
3
.  The distribution of surpluses to staff is based 
not on the profitability of the bank itself, but on the profitability of its co-operative members (Whyte 
and Whyte, 1991; Davidmann, 1996).  Staff receive a share of surpluses (profits) based on how well 
their customers perform financial, not how well the bank performs.   
These examples crystalize conceptual differences: private enterprises issue governance rights to 
founding entrepreneurs and institutional investors through share capital; commonly owned 
enterprises have no share capital so governance rights are ‘entrusted’ to a trustee board; member-
owned enterprises issue governance rights to members, and also issue (non-voting) share capital to 
members on the basis of their contribution to the enterprise (see Birchall, 2011, 2012).  Where 
common ownership develops, this reinforces a unitary communitarianism by replacing the interests 
of an entrepreneur or small elite with those of a mass membership.  Rights and status are conditional 
on obedience to conservative moral and social standards set by a legitimating authority.  Joint 
ownership and co-ownership differ by developing a pluralist form of communitarianism.  In this case, 
institutions are created to reconcile competing individuals and groups on the presumption that 
members have equal rights and status (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 - Distinguishing Private and Member-Owned Enterprises 
Communitarianism
Identity is 
socially constructed
Private Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by founder(s) and 
investors to the exclusion of 
primary stakeholders
(Not a co-operative)
Common Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by a legal entity 
for a primary stakeholder 
with no share capital issued
(e.g. mutuals/cooperatives 
owned by trusts, mutuals 
and cooperatives)
Joint Ownership
Enterprises owned by a 
primary stakeholder group  
through individual member 
accounts.
(Mutuals/cooperatives jointly 
owned by individual 
members)
Co-ownership
Combining common and 
joint ownership systems to 
promote social solidarity 
between stakeholders.
(Mixed ownership systems 
that recognise individual and 
organisational members)
Pluralism
Society is best served by 
encouraging diversity
Unitarism
Society is best served 
by creating consensus
Individualism
Identity is 
a product of free will
 
[Author 1], yyy2, Figure 4 
Social Entrepreneurship  
Since the 1990s, entrepreneurial action in pursuit of social goals and society level transformations 
has been studied as a distinct discipline. Alvord et al. (2004) argue that social entrepreneurship has 
been theorised in a multitude of ways: as the use of business practices to make social organisations 
viable (Emerson and Twerksy, 1996); as action to make sustainable improvements in the well-being 
of marginalized communities (Dees, 1998; Nicholls, 2006); and as the reconfiguration of existing 
resources to improve welfare (Uphoff et al., 1998).  Recently, however, more focus has been placed 
on the value propositions of social entrepreneurs (Martin and Osberg, 2007; Chell, 2007), the social 
and ‘shared value’ they create (Porter and Kramer, 2011) and the social innovations that sustain them 
(Perrini and Vurco, 2006; Nicholls and Murdock, 2012).  In making sense of Figure 3, we emphasise 
Alvord et al. (2004) and the contention that social entrepreneurship can be regarded as the capacity 
for social innovation, particularly the redistribution power and wealth that leads to the creation of a 
social economy (see Amin, 2009; [Author 1] and [Author 2], 2013).  
Robert Owen, the Rochdale Pioneers, John Spedan Lewis, Fr. Arizmendi (and those that 
subsequently built on their work) used business practices instrumentally to improve the welfare of 
their community.  Their social entrepreneurship is expressed primarily through social innovations in 
the constitution of organisations that trade to secure long-term improvements in the well-being of 
primary stakeholders (labour, users) and secondary stakeholders (founders and investors).  Indeed, 
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their work reframes who a ‘primary stakeholder’ is by redefining the role and rights of capital, 
criteria for enterprise membership, systems of reporting and accountability, and institutions that 
change the ‘voices’ that are influential in decision-making.  In each case, the private enterprise goal 
of generating a financial surplus and appropriating it from primary stakeholders is replaced by the 
social enterprise goal of generating a financial surplus in order to allocate it to them in fairer 
proportions. 
Integrating Co-operative Practices and Social Entrepreneurship 
[Author 1] and [Author 2] (2011) identity four sets of multi-stakeholder model rules (see 
Appendix A) that are mature attempts to connect social entrepreneurship to constitutional reforms:  
1) Stakeholder Model Ltd devised by Geof Cox Associates;  
2) Co-operative CIC model devised by Co-operatives UK;  
3) NewCo Model devised by Morgan Killick and Bill Barker; 
4) Surplus Sharing Social Enterprise Model devised by [Author 1].   
Further investigation of these models ([Author 1, 2012]) noted that the 2009 Somerset Rules also 
offer a multi-stakeholder model under Industrial and Provident Society Law (IPS).  As these are cited 
by the FairShares Association as immediate antecedents, we now trace the connection between the 
wider co-operative and social enterprise movements, the antecedent model rules, and the influence 
they have had on the FairShares Model.  
An introductory document (retrieved from www.fairshares.wikispot.org/FairShares_Model, states 
on p. 14-15 that the work of Jaroslav Vanek (1970) on Yugoslavia’s co-operatives is a key 
intellectual source for thinking on employee-ownership and worker co-operation.  Pateman (1970) 
identifies the Yugoslav economy as a rare governmental attempt to support a national programme of 
producer associations within a co-operative economy.  Vanek argued that Yugoslav
4
 labour-managed 
firms bridged a social divide by removing ownership structures that created the incentive for 
managers to distance themselves socially from production workers.  The logic of Vanek’s argument 
is repeated in the works of Ellerman (1984, 1990), Turnbull (1994, 1995, 2002) and Erdal (2000, 
2011).  All argue that the employment relationship (within the firm) is a more significant source of 
exploitation and inequality than market exchange (outside the firm).  The subordination of labour 
through employment contracts alienates the workforce (labour) from both the surplus value and 
Intellectual Property they create.  
However, this is just one of several arguments that underpin the FairShares Model.  A page of the 
FairShares Wiki offers alternative explanations for surplus generation and the way a FairShares 
Company or Co-operative should distribute surpluses: 
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The FairShares Model is based on an acceptance that there is more than one way to generate a surplus. 
1.  Paying people who provide produce or labour less than their product or labour is worth;  
2.  Charging customers / users more for goods and services than it costs to produce them;  
3.  Investing finance in human, intellectual and social capital to reduce the costs of production. 
As there is no easy way to distinguish between labour, user and investor contributions to the creation of 
accounting surpluses, the members of a FairShares Company / Co-operative have to decide the 
proportion of profit/surplus to distribute as dividends to each group.  By default, a 50/50 division is 
assumed where there is one primary and secondary stakeholder (e.g. User and Investor Shareholders, 
or Labour and Investor Shareholders). Where there are two primary stakeholder groups, the default 
proportions are 35% (Labour), 35% (Users) and 30% (Investors). 
http://www.fairshares.wikispot.org/Who_creates_the_surplus, accessed 11
th
 July 2013. 
These ideas for constituting social enterprises can be found in antecedent models (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 – Direct Influences on the Antecedents of the FairShares Model 
Model Practitioner influences cited Theoretical influences cited 
Stakeholder Model Ltd (7.1) devised by 
Geof Cox Associates  to offer: 
- Stewardship Shares (trusteeship) 
- Partnership Shares (workers/users) 
- Investor Shares (supporters) 
 Kermase Food Co-operative 
 Fair Trade Movement  
 Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd 
 Lippy People (David Tomalin) 
 North East Music Co-operative Ltd 
 New Labour debates about the 
retention of ‘Clause 4’ and common 
ownership. 
 Co-operative journals / readings  
 Paul Golan and Anthony Jensen’s 
writings on industrial relations 
 (opposition to) Charlie Cattell’s 
single stakeholder / common 
ownership model 
Co-operative CIC (7.2) devised by Co-
operatives UK to ‘consult’ with: 
- Employees, Funders 
- Suppliers, Customers 
- Community Representatives 
 Co-operative Legal Services 
 Co-operative movement members 
 UK Labour Government (1997 – 2003) 
 Industrial and Provident Society Law 
 Rochdale Principles 
 ICA Co-operative Values and 
Principles 
(N.B. no single author cited) 
NewCo Model (7.3) devised by 
Bill Barker and Morgan Killick:  
- A Shares (entrepreneurs) 
- B Shares (clients / customers) 
- C Shares (employees) 
- Social Equity (supporters) 
 Sheffield Community Economic 
Development Unit (Bill Barker / Dave 
Thornett) 
 ESP Projects Ltd 
 Readings on ‘political economy’ (in 
the context of MA studies) 
 Karl Polanyi (“Great 
Transformation”) 
 
Surplus Sharing Model (7.4) 
By [Author 1] to offer: 
- Founder Shares (entrepreneurs) 
- Labour Shares 
- Investor Shares  
 
 Democratic Business Ltd  
(Gavin Boby) 
 Sheffield Co-operative Development 
Group (Alan Dootson) 
 School Trends Ltd (Peter Beeby and Rick 
Norris) 
 Employee Ownership Association (under 
David Erdal) 
 Mondragon Corporation (field visit 
hosted by Mikel Lezamiz) 
 Dr Poonam Thapa 
 Co-operative and Social Enterprise 
Journals 
 Guy Major and Gavin Boby’s 
writings on ‘equity devalution’ and 
‘value added sharing’ 
 The Community Company Model 
(see Coad and Cullen, 2001). 
N.B. Major and Boby presented their 
findings in a conference on Vanek’s 
work, and also make specific mention 
of the The Democratic Firm by David 
Ellerman as a key source. 
Sources: Cases 7.1 - 7.4 in [Author 1] and [Author 2] (2011), and related background studies 
In the narrative provided by the FairShares Association ([Author 1] et al., yyy3) the work of Guy 
Major and Gavin Body on a ‘Democratic Business’ model (Major, 1996, 1998; Major and Boby, 
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2000) is cited as a direct influence on the FairShares Model.  Adapted versions of their rules were 
developed at Computercraft Ltd to spin out First Contact Software Ltd (2001), at New Horizons 
Music Ltd (2006) and Social Exchange Ltd (2007)
5
.  In 2007, the ‘surplus sharing’ label (7.4) was 
attached when it was published by the Common Cause Foundation.   
From 2007 onwards, the first signs of conscious convergence towards a FairShares Model begin 
to appear.  The ‘social economy’ shareholders of the NewCo Model (Case 7.3) and commitments to 
social auditing and fair trade principles in the Stakeholder Model appear in version 2.0 of the Surplus 
Sharing Social Enterprise Model (Case 7.4).  After [Author 1] interviewed Geof Cox and Morgan 
Killick in 2010 and 2012 to learn more about the development of Cases 7.1 and 7.3, the 
characteristics of share capital and the exclusion of pre-emption rights were reaffirmed, while 
modifications were made to the transferability of shares to reflect debates about structuring fair trade 
supply chains and employee-owned companies (Davies et al., Doherty et al., 2013; 2009; Erdal, 
2011).  Figure 6 (retrieved from the FairShares Wiki) shows how the FairShares Association links 
antecedent model rules to share classes in the FairShares Model. 
Figure 6 – Connecting Antecedent Model Rules to the FairShares Model 
 
Source: FairShares Basics.pps, www.fairshares.wikispot.org/Background, accessed 2
nd
 July 2013. 
The influence of antecedent model rules goes deeper than share types.  Case 7.1, 7.3 and 7.4 
evolved multi-stakeholder governance systems that enfranchise consumers and workforce members 
without marginalising social entrepreneurs: Case 7.1 provides for Stewardship Shares; Case 7.3 has 
‘Class A’ shares; Case 7.4 has ‘founder shares’.  Each model gives specific recognition and 
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protection to the entrepreneurial labour of founders.  This is a clear difference to the Co-operative 
CIC (7.2) and Somerset Rules – while both make commitments to multi-stakeholder governance, 
they do not protect the position of founders.  Similarly, three cases (7.1, 7.3 and 7.4) include share 
types that function like Ordinary Shares in a private company.  While this is retained in the Company 
Law version of the FairShares Model, the IPS version pursues ideas found in Somerset Rules to limit 
the distribution of residual assets to members, and on the ‘capital account’ system at Mondragon. 
The FairShares Model depends on a capacity to issue shares and therefore is offered only under 
Company Law and Co-operative Law.  The Company Law version includes ‘investor shares’ that can 
grow in value, and which are subject to (restricted) trading rights permitted in employee-owned 
companies.  The Co-operative Law (IPS) version replaces ‘investor shares’ with ‘investor accounts’ 
that function like the ‘capital accounts’ at Mondragon.  Investor accounts accrue interest (following 
Rochdale Principles) and are credited with a share of surpluses (following Mondragon Principles).   
In the next section, we evaluate these arrangements further using the proxies for communitarian 
pluralism (see Figures 1 and 2).    
Is this Communitarian Pluralism? 
Six variants of the FairShares Model are grouped into three pairs: 
1. Labour dominated (Worker Co-operative / Employee-Owned Social Enterprise) 
2. User dominated (User Co-operative / User-Owned Social Enterprise) 
3. No dominant group (Social Co-operative / Social Enterprise) 
The term ‘co-operative’ is used where incorporation takes place under Co-operative Law and 
‘social enterprise’ is used where incorporation is under Company Law.  In other respects, the models 
are aligned and have similar articles of association with the same clause numbering. 
Pluralising Ownership 
Three other share types (founder, labour, user) are available across all variants.  These have a par 
value (i.e. they do not change in value) and regulate each member’s right to a ‘voice’, their share of 
surpluses, and their entitlement to acquire investor shares.  Founder shares only grant governance 
and (limited) management rights to their holders, while all share types entitle holders to meet in 
general meeting and pass ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ resolutions.  The creation of share classes means 
there are rights to pass ‘class resolutions’ (on a one shareholder, one-vote basis) in specific situations, 
including key decisions to merge, sell or dissolve an enterprise. 
The FairShares Model is, therefore, primarily based on joint and co-ownership principles.  With 
three share classes in variants 1) and 2) and four in variant 3) full provision is made for 
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multi-stakeholder ownership: founder shares recognise entrepreneurial labour; labour shares 
recognise the labour of workers and employees, and can be extended to suppliers (including small 
producers) if voted for by members; user shares recognise the trading of individual consumers 
(whether direct or indirectly purchased), and can be extended to corporate consumers at the 
discretion of members.  Given the presence of share classes, rights and responsibilities can be 
regarded – to some degree – as ‘corporatist’ (see Figure 1).  While individualism dominates within 
classes and ordinary resolutions at general meetings, when a special resolution is required members 
votes as a class as well as individuals.  Group interests, therefore, become important when the 
biggest decisions are made (e.g. constitutional changes, mergers, sales and dissolutions).  In short, a 
FairShares Company / Co-operative cannot be sold, merged or dissolved unless all interests consent. 
There are also two ways in which common ownership is advanced.  Firstly, there is a 
‘community dividend’ on dissolution if a start-up or development grant has been provided by a 
public or charitable source.  Secondly, private shareholdings can be sold (or transferred) to 
organisations established for employee, community or charitable benefit (as happens in companies 
owned by employee-benefit and/or charitable trusts).  The model articles make financial provision 
for this through a mandatory redemption fund.  This fund acquires a share of surpluses to fund the 
re-purchase of member shareholdings (in the company version) and settle ‘investor accounts’ (in the 
co-operative version).  Eventually, these investment management instruments will either reinforce 
joint and co-ownership system by distributing the shares purchased to new (labour and user) 
members, or reinforce common ownership by transferring ownership to organisations established for 
employee, community or charitable benefit. 
Pluralism is reinforced in another way by developing an idea in Case 7.4 that is rooted in the 
‘value added sharing’ arguments of Major (1996, 1998).  Major’s argument that co-operative 
structures suffer from ‘equity devaluation’ is evidenced by the manner in which demutualisations 
occurred in building societies (see Cook et al., 2002).  In mutual ventures, full (market) value is 
unrepresented in the capital structure.  Demutualisations occurred when managers familiar with 
private sector norms were able to ‘see’ the value hidden by accounting systems.   
In the private sector, the concept of a ‘share premium account’ captures the difference between 
the original face value of a share purchase and its projected market value.  The value in the share 
premium account is appropriated by shareholders through rules that prevent the issue of more shares 
without their consent, or pre-emption rights that give them a chance to purchase new share issues 
before they are offered to others.  In the FairShares Model pre-emption rights are excluded, and a 
provision in the constitution ensures that ‘capital gains’ are distributed to new user and labour 
shareholders.  This is achieve through the allocation of investor shares (in companies) and credits to 
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investor accounts (in co-operatives).  Half the ‘capital gain’ each year is allocated to labour and user 
shareholders (ensuring that financial gains are credited to labour and user shareholders in the form of 
new capital or new credits).  This ensures that members who have acquired labour shares (for their 
work) and user shares (for their trade) also acquire investor shares, and that the remainder of the 
capital gain raises the value of their shares (the ‘fair price’).  If there are deficits, however, share 
values and account balances fall (as they do at Mondragon). 
Pluralising Governance and Management 
The second approach to communitarian pluralism – one which departs significantly from its 
antecedents - is a much deeper commitment to intellectual property (IP) using Creative Commons 
licencing.  In the introductory document ([Author 1] et al.,  p. 15) reference is made to a discussion 
document about Creative Commons at Sheffield’s School for Democratic Socialism (organised by 
the local Co-operative Party).  The potential of Creative Commons to end worker alienation from 
their IP and create an ‘intellectual commons’ is a response to Business Link advice that: 
The good news [for business owners] is that rights to IP created by employees generally belong to the 
employer. Showing that a member of staff has an employment contract is usually enough to prove you 
own all IP rights. But it's a good idea to state the position explicitly in separate clauses of employees' 
contracts. This prevents any confusion arising - perhaps over work created outside office hours or as a 
by-product of specified work.  
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?itemId=1074300742&type=RESOURCES,  
accessed 8
th
 January 2012.  
In private enterprises, the dominant norm is that the employer owns all IP - even from ‘work 
created outside office hours or as a by-product of specified work’.  Employees and customers have 
no copyright in the IP they create – it is transferred to the ‘legal person’ who employs or contracts 
them.  The FairShares Model, however, introduces itself with the following statement: 
Imagine an enterprise where the knowledge creation model of Wikipedia is combined with the 
governance model of the John Lewis Partnership and the values and principles of the Co-operative 
Group? 
www.fairshares.coop, accessed 11
th
 July 2013.      
The knowledge creation system of Wikipedia is based on Creative Commons – a system of six 
licences that protect the creator of IP by requiring recognition of their contribution.  The individual 
creating the IP can define the rights that others have in their creation.  This is taken up in Article 53 
which state that the organisation will:  
…ensure that ownership of all IP remains vested in its creator(s). For the avoidance of doubt, the 
[company] / [co-operative] shall not own IP created by members before, during or after their period of 
membership unless ownership is freely and voluntarily transferred by those members to the [company] / 
[co-operation].  
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Cathcart (2013, p. 5) notes the ‘radical intent to share knowledge and power’ in the writings of 
John Spedan Lewis (Lewis, 1948, 1954).  In a contemporary context, these values and principles are 
enacted through Wikis with content regulated by Creative Commons licences.  The FairShares Wiki 
is organised on this basis: some pages are open to the public; all content is accessible to registered 
supporters; editing rights are restricted to founder, labour, user and investor shareholders.  
In practice, this system may face difficulties where IP is acquired from a third party, or where it 
is impossible to identify or agree which members created some IP.  The model rules do not resolve 
how IP will be owned where its creators cannot be identified.   However, the intent to create an 
intellectual commons for the benefit of members is unambiguous.  Moreover, the numerous 
web-based Wikis that now underpin communities of practice suggest this is a viable proposition 
(Vickery and Wunsch-Vincent, 2007; Boulos and Wheeler, 2007). 
The IP management arrangements, and multiple classes of shareholders, represent a ‘loose 
network of independent governing bodies’.  This looseness comes not just from the different 
shareholder classes, but from the arrangements for an intellectual commons (in which copyrights are 
held by whichever members’ have created it).  This strengthens the bargaining position of members 
in relation to managers because it is within their power to change an exclusive right to commercialise 
IP into a non-exclusive right (by leaving).  This power is similar to the consumer power identified by 
Smith and Teasdale (2012) that could be transferred between mutual providers of welfare services.  
Under FairShares arrangements, producers (employees) gain power in proportion to their capacity to 
produce IP, but – on account of the Creative Commons approach – cannot ‘privatise’ it, only take it 
elsewhere and develop it further.  Logically, this should lead to a more egalitarian culture, with 
member-relations superseding manager-worker relations as more and more members create IP. 
Figure 7 summarises this section, and draws out how communitarian pluralist principles have been 
operationalised in the FairShares Model.  
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Figure 7 – Communitarian Pluralism in the FairShares Model 
Proxy Indicator Antecedent Models     FairShares Model 
Multiple share classes Stewardship Shares - Class A Shares - Founder Shares  Founder Shares 
 Partnership Shares - Class B Shares  User Shares 
 Partnership Shares - Class C Shares - Labour Shares  Labour Shares 
 Investment Shares – Class A Shares - Investor Shares  Investor Shares 
Joint Ownership /  
Co-ownership 
Co-ownership (individual / organisational members)  Provisions for founder, user and labour shareholders to acquire 
investor shares.  Values realised by selling to mutual organisations 
established for employee, community or public benefit. 
Owners / Trustees from two 
or more stakeholders 
At least three classes of shareholder (or stakeholder) provided 
for at incorporation. 
 1 class at incorporation (founders), with 2 or 3 other classes 
established as the business develops (typically over 3 – 5 years). 
Governance 
Loose network of 
independent governing 
bodies 
Preference for unitary boards elected from each class of 
shareholder 
 Operationalised through main/sub boards elected by shareholder 
classes (elections triggered by a member threshold fixed at 
incorporation). 
Direct Democracy / 
Sociocracy 
All stakeholders have a route to membership 
Limited protection of minority interests 
 All stakeholders can become members and/or governors; explicit 
protection of minority interests (special resolutions); explicit 
provision for mediation to resolve member conflicts. 
Multiple beneficiary groups Stewards / Partners / Investors (Case 7.1) 
Class A, B and C (Case 7.3) 
Founders, Labour and Investors (Case 7.4) 
 User, Labour and Investor Shareholders; “community dividend” 
upon merger, acquisition or dissolution based on the level of 
public/charitable grants. 
Management 
Reconciliation / negotiation 
of political interests 
Case 7.1 - Electoral college voting in general meetings 
Case 7.3 – Employees hold the balance of power 
Case 7.4 – Classes of shareholder have same rights in GM 
 One member, one vote for ordinary and special resolutions; 
electoral college system when a poll is called; one member, one-
vote (then one class, one-vote) for special resolutions. 
Matrix management / dual 
reporting systems 
Case 7.1 – No specific provisions 
Case 7.3 – Entrepreneur(s) as main decision-maker(s) 
Case 7.4 – Dual reporting (executive and shareholders) 
 Flexible reporting system (accountability to executives, shareholder 
classes, and creators of IP). 
Member relations / culture 
of associative 
entrepreneurship/democracy 
Case 7.1 - Member-ownership culture with strong board 
Case 7.2 – User / producer member-ownership culture 
Case 7.3 – Entrepreneurial culture moderated / constrained by 
member-ownership 
Case 7.4 – Member-owner culture with clearly defined 
executive responsibilities 
 Member-ownership culture, with private and/or social investors 
approved by member resolution; provisions for delegation of 
executive powers to a CEO or executive group defined by the  
constitution; explicit provision for sharing IP through Creative 
Common licensing by members. 
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Implications for Theory and Practice 
Arthur el al. (2003) suggests that mutual principles encourage all primary stakeholders (producers, 
employees, consumers and users) to participate in the ownership, governance and management of the 
enterprises on which they depend.  These commitments – evident in the FairShares Model - are 
consistent with the advancement of ‘associative entrepreneurship’ (Scott-Cato et al., 2008) and 
‘associative democracy’ that combines internal (democratic) and external (market-driven) challenges 
to governing bodies (Hirst, 1994; Smith and Teasdale, 2012).  This represents a communitarian 
pluralist discourse that influences how constitutions are developed. 
[Author 1] and Southcombe (2012) coined the phrase ‘socialised enterprise’ to describe the 
application of these principles, particularly the integration of primary stakeholders into systems for 
ownership, governance and management.  In subsequent work (cited on the FairShares Wiki), further 
clarifications on how ‘socialised’ enterprises differ from ‘privatised’ and ‘nationalised’ enterprises 
were published ([Author 1], 2012, Figure 4).  ‘Privatised’ enterprises pursue strategies that secure 
monopoly (or, failing that, oligopoly) control over markets so that the wealth and power generated by 
producers and consumers can be appropriated by those who provide financial capital.  ‘Nationalised’ 
enterprises use the agency of the state to secure access to market goods, and do so for either public 
benefit or to secure government interests.   
The FairShares Model promotes neither of these models – it promotes ‘socialised enterprises’ that 
regulate the allocation of wealth, power and knowledge to primary stakeholders while limiting the 
power and wealth available to financial investors.  The FairShares Model limits the state’s ability to 
appropriate power from founders, labour, users or investors without their consent.  Even if they 
secure a stake, the voting system makes it impossible to use it against the interests of other primary 
stakeholders.  Similarly, absentee-investors even if they gain access to capital, they still have to share 
their capital gains with (new) labour and user shareholders. 
In Phase 2 of this research, the take up these ideas in practice will be assessed.  In anticipating the 
next phase, it is – perhaps - significant that the FairShares Model has emerged from existing practice.  
It comes from existing model rules for companies and co-operative societies that have been advanced 
by consultant-practitioners and their academic supporters.  In all cases, the model rules reflect 
aggregations of experience based on decades of involvement in co-operative and social enterprise 
development (not just the last few years).  In Phase 2, survey instruments and interviews with 
founders and supporters will enable a fuller assessment of its potential. 
This paper is limited to tracing its historical antecedents, and identifying the core propositions 
regarding the allocation of wealth, power and knowledge.  In looking forward, any number of 
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pathways look possible.  One - culled from the strapline of the FairShares Association – stands out.  
It calls for a transition ‘from Fairtrade to FairShares’, perhaps reflecting a connection to fair trade 
through one set of antecedent model rules (7.2) and its authors’ stated involvement in the fair trade 
movement.  Just as fair trade has challenged how the benefits from market transactions should be 
divided between producers, consumers and business owners, so the FairShares Model offers a way 
to challenge how share transactions affect the division of benefits.  Given the renewed attention to 
addressing supply chain issues in the fair trade movement by finding new way to enfranchise 
producers and consumers (Davies et al., 2009; Doherty et al., 2013), the FairShares Model could 
become a natural ally in the next phase of development. 
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Appendix A - Five Antecedents of the FairShares Model 
Model Rules Brief Description 
Case 7.1 
Stakeholder Model Ltd  
The rules were designed by Geof Cox Associates, a specialist in the development and 
support of Social Firms, and were published by the Common Cause Foundation.  
Underpinned by a Company Limited by Shares, the model rules define the power of an 
active board, elected by each shareholder group.  Three share types are defined: 
 Stewardship Shares (for trustees / directors appointed for social purposes) 
 Partnership Shares (for employees and customers) 
 Investment Shares (for external supporters / social investors) 
Case 7.2 
Cooperative CIC Model  
 
Designed and published by Cooperatives UK in response to the introduction of 
Community Interest Company legislation in 2005.  Underpinned by a Company Limited 
by Guarantee or Shares, the model rules are framed to encourage active user and worker 
membership on the basis of one-person, one-vote, with a commitment to consult: 
 Employees 
 Funders 
 Suppliers 
 Customers 
 Community representatives 
Case 7.3 
NewCo Model of Social 
Enterprise 
 
 
Designed by Morgan Killick and Bill Barker in 2002, with support from the Sheffield 
Community Economic Development Unit.  Underpinned by a Company Limited by Shares, 
a 2004 version gave control and decision-making power to three classes of shareholder, 
and investment rights to a fourth: 
 Class A Shares (for social entrepreneurs) 
 Class B Shares (for social economy customers / clients) 
 Class C Shares (for employees) 
 Social Equity Shares (for philanthropic supporters / social investors) 
Case 7.4 
Surplus Sharing Model for 
Social Enterprise (CLS) 
 
 
With a heritage stretching back to the work of Guy Major and Gavin Body in the mid-
1990s, the surplus sharing rules developed by [Author 1] at Sheffield Business School 
embrace co-operative principles across the labour/capital divide.  The rules  provide for 
active membership control on the basis of one-person, one vote, with special provisions 
for issuing: 
 Founder Shares (for social entrepreneurs / social investors) 
 Labour Shares (for employees, workers and suppliers) 
 Investor Shares (for employees, workers and others chosen by members’). 
Somerset Rules 
IPS Multi-Stakeholder 
Co-operative 
With a heritage in co-operative, rather than company law, Somerset Model Rules have 
been adopted for the purchase of community shops, pubs and agriculture projects.  At 
incorporation, members define and label classes of shareholder and establish 
membership criteria.  As Somerset Co-operative Services explain: 
“They enable a co-operative enterprise to be 'shared' by more than one group of 
stakeholders.  For example, a community supported agriculture scheme could be 50% 
controlled by producers, and 50% by consumers. Or a business could be 60% 
controlled by its workers, and 40% by the local community” 
Source: http://www.somerset.coop/somersetrules 
Cases 1 – 4 based on cases 7.1 – 7.4 in [Author 1] and [Author 2], 2011 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
  A Google search for the term "John Lewis Economy" (exact match) yielded 66,600 hits, while the terms "John 
Lewis State" (exact match) yielded 730,000 hits (on 1
st
 July 2013). 
2
  The arrangements of the Co-operative Group are summarised at www.co-operative.coop.  To find the 
information, navigate to Home -> Sustainability -> Delivering Value -> Modern Co-operation -> Democratic 
Structure. 
3
  Based on field notes collected by [Author 1] during a field visit on 5
th/
6
th
 March 2003. 
4
  After the Yugoslav wars, Yugoslavia divided in the following states: Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Hertzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia).  In 2006, Montenegro separated from Serbia. 
  
5
  [Author 1] was a co-founder in each case.  First Contact Software Ltd was co-founded by 5 other people, 
New Horizons Music Ltd with 3 others, and Social Exchange Ltd with 2 others. 
